Bill Adams

When writing apparatus purchasing specifications, many fire departments procure the services of individuals or entities not affiliated with the fire department-outsiders. Except for those purchasing apparatus regularly, most departments don't have personnel with the time or expertise to spec out today's complex, expensive, and multiagency-regulated fire apparatus. Even in larger municipalities with career purchasing departments, the fire department is expected to, at a minimum, provide the technical verbiage for the "nuts and bolts"-all the parts, pieces, and accoutrements comprising a new rig. Seeking assistance is admirable; not doing so is questionable; and doing a poor job may be inexcusable. Good luck.

Historically, a preferred vendor always "helped" a purchaser write the specifications. Being the chosen one makes that vendor extremely happy for obvious reasons needing no further elaboration. Although the practice of vendors writing purchasing specifications is commonplace, most on the fire side do not or will not address the issue. Those who believe the subject, if not broached, will quietly go away are sadly mistaken. Documented indiscretions, irregularities, and conflicts of interest in the public bidding arena abound. Whether having a potential bidder write purchasing specifications for a political subdivision is legally, ethically, or politically correct is a matter left to the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ). It is not addressed herein.

A word of caution for fire departments: It may be immaterial whether a claim of wrongdoing is true or not. The mere seriousness of a charge made in the public arena may do irreparable damage to a fire department's reputation. Tread lightly and carefully in the legal purchasing arena. Municipal fiscal uncertainty, political correctness in the media, and aggressive marketing because of declining apparatus sales have changed the marketplace.

Definitions

There are professional and degreed consultants who evaluate and prepare formal reports evaluating a community's fire protection resources that may include recommending purchases, fire station location, staffing, training, and so on. We are not talking about them. My definition of a fire apparatus consultant is one who advises on, writes specifications for, and recommends component parts for a fire truck purchase. In this article, a consultant and a specification writer (spec writer) are synonymous. Both are outsiders.

My interpretation of a spec writer is someone knowledgeable enough on a subject to put it to pen and paper in a manner understandable to all potential bidders. Spec writers are not necessarily consultants; they can be just scribes. Proficiency in the mechanics of proper grammar and not brutalizing the King's English notwithstanding, just who are these outsiders who write fire truck specifications? They've been called experts and consultants. A consultant can be an adviser, a mentor, and a counselor. An expert is considered someone who is proficient and knowledgeable. There are also pundits and commentators. A pundit can be a specialist or a guru. A commentator is a critic, an observer, and an analyst-it's a reporter-someone who is not generally held accountable. Who do you want to write your specifications-an expert, a pundit, a consultant, or a maharishi?

The point is that there is no single definition of who is a competent and capable fire apparatus spec writer. There are no written qualifications. There is no formal test to pass to become one. Acceptable qualifications are in the eyes of the beholder. Purchasers must determine the expertise they desire in a spec writer. If you are going to pick someone to help you spend a half a million to a million bucks on a fire truck, choose wisely. Hopefully, this article will help.

Reality

In addition to qualifications, purchasers should be explicit

By David Durstine

Has your department ever laid large-diameter hose (LDH) down the freeway at 65 miles per hour (mph)? Have you ever dumped a crosslay onto the sidewalk while taking a corner? Well, I can tell you first hand that it happens when you least expect it, and it can be prevented.

My department, a small rural volunteer department in central Ohio, was en route to a vehicle fire one Sunday afternoon when a simple gust of wind lifted a section of four-inch hose up off the hosebed of our engine. Before we knew what had happened, we laid 1,000 feet of four-inch hose right down the middle of a busy county road at 55 mph. This came much to our surprise when following apparatus called on the radio to notify us that we had no LDH on our engine.

This type of incident typically would not have happened to my department, but just days before we had performed our annual hose testing and decided it would be okay to leave our hosebed cover off to allow any remaining moisture in the hose to dry. In my case, it ended with a disgruntled crew of firefighters rolling and reloading 1,000 feet of four-inch hose and a department understanding the importance of hose restraints-but it could have ended much differently.

Hose Restraints

Prior to 2006, the traditional North American-style hosebed rarely had anything to restrain the hose from falling off the sides or the back. In fact, we often saw loops of hose hanging off the back of the hosebed as if yearning to escape. As with my department's situation, once one length begins to drag on the road it is liable to keep on going. The more hose that comes off, the more friction there is to pull the rest of the hose out of the bed. And with each section connected, there can be a lot of hose dragging behind the truck without the driver ever being aware.

In the best case, the driver looks in his mirror and notices the ribbon of hose left behind the truck. And just like in my department's case, it is just an inconvenience and embarrassment to the crew. In the worst case, the hose will whip its way down the street, leaving mayhem in its wake. This is what happened on August 19, 2004, to two young girls and their mother when the Coraopolis (PA) Volunteer Fire Department unknowingly drove down the street trailing hose behind it.

It was this incident that prompted the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Apparatus Committee to initiate an immediate change to the NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus and NFPA 1906, Standard for Wildland Fire Apparatuss in January 2006. This mandate required each new apparatus to have a means of restraining hose, whether stored in the main hosebed, or anywhere else on the apparatus. Fire Apparatus Manufacturers Association (FAMA) companies scrambled to come up with an effective means of keeping the hose where it belongs during travel. Fire departments soon weighed in with their own ideas, and today hose restraints are available in any number of shapes, sizes, colors, and designs. Besides the simple nets or straps secured with clips or hook-and-loop material, departments can select metal, vinyl, or even roll-up covers.

Pre-2006 Apparatus

So what about all those apparatus that were manufactured prior to 2006? Many fire chiefs, like my chief, have recognized the need to update their older apparatus. Restraint solutions suitable for retrofit onto older apparatus are available from most FAMA companies. Alternately, department safety officers can work with local canvas, tent and awning, or boat cover shops to custom fit their hosebeds with satisfactory restraints.

Hose restraints had been around in limited use for many years but until 2006 were still optional equipment. There is a definite parallel here with the introduction of automotive safety devices such as seat belts and air bags. These, too, were optional equipment for years before they were mandated

By Raul A. Angulo

No survival story has affected me more than Black Sunday when six FDNY firefighters were forced to jump for their lives from the fourth floor of a burning apartment building on January 23, 2005. Two firefighters were killed in the fall, four were critically injured, and only one would return to full duty.

The Bronx fire occurred in an old four-story, ordinary construction apartment building. The fire started in a unit on floor three and extended up to floor four. These firefighters were sent to floor four for search and rescue and to check for extension. They encountered moderate smoke but no sign of fire.

(1) Most bunker pants cargo pockets can accommodate 50 feet of 7.5-mm rope, a descender, and the Seattle Hook. Designating a cargo pocket as self-rescue pocket keeps your bailout system ready to deploy. (Photos by author.)

For some reason the attack line lost water so the exposure line on floor four was redirected back down to floor four. Firefighter Jeff Cool had the thermal imaging camera (TIC) and opened up a wall that was registering hot in the apartment directly above the fire unit. Fire immediately started coming through the hole and spread into the room. They called for another hoseline, but conditions turned ugly in seconds. Fire extended from floor to ceiling into the hallway and the apartment, trapping the firefighters on the fourth floor.

What should have been one apartment was illegally subdivided into multiple smaller units, creating a labyrinth of walls and rooms that hid their normal egress routes to the fire escape. The firefighters were forced to four separate windows. With the intense heat and flames, four firefighters rolled out and hoped for the best. Cool, who was with his partner, Firefighter Joe DiBernardo, had a personal rescue rope but no place to tie off. After a quick argument, they decided since Cool had a wife and kids, he would go first. DiBernardo stepped on the rope and wrapped it around his arm to belay Cool as he rappelled down, but Cool lost his grip and fell 40 feet to the pavement, breaking almost every bone in his body. DiBernardo tied the rope off to a window guard and tried to lower himself down, but the rope broke and he also fell, landing feet first and breaking every bone below his waist.

Cool, though severely injured, fell only 40 feet at grade level. Because there was a basement and a below-grade walkway on the C side of this building, it added an extra 10 feet to that side. Unfortunately, five firefighters fell in this space, making it a 50-foot fall that killed Lieutenants Curtis Meyran and John Bellew and severely injured Firefighters Eugene Stolowski and Brendan Cawley. DiBernardo died in 2011 from long-lasting complications of the injuries he sustained on Black Sunday. His death was finally ruled to be in the line of duty.

(2) If your bunker pants don't have a built-in harness, you can assemble or purchase a class 1 harness and lay it over your inside liners and boots. As you step into your boots, you're stepping into your harness without disturbing the integrity of your bunker gear. With one carabiner, you can clip your harness into your descender, which is connected to your hook. Your system is ready to deploy.

Personal Escape Systems

I saw the four survivors give their gut-wrenching presentation at the Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC). I remember feeling physically ill as they explained in detail the fall,